IN the ongoing debate over the continued existence and scope of the American exclusionary rule, critics of the rule, such as Chief Justice Burger, often have claimed that it is "unique to American jurisprudence."' The assertion that the United States is the only country with an exclusionary rule is an impressive one, and Judge Malcolm Wilkey is not alone in arguing that "one proof of the irrationality of the exclusionary rule is that no other civilized nation in the world has adopted it. '' 2 Defenders of the rule have been able to respond to this argument only by noting that other countries are often characterized by better police discipline, lower crime rates, or greater racial or social homogeneity than is the United States The research for this Article was done at the Max Planck Institute for Criminal Law, Freiburg, West Germany, on a grant from the Alexander von Humboldt Stiftung, whose support I greatly appreciate. I express special thanks to Dr. Thomas Weigend of the Max Planck Institute, whose help, through all phases of this research project, was invaluable. I also express my appreciation to Professors Karl-Heinz G6ssel, John Langbein, and Alex Tanford for their helpful comments on an earlier draft of this Article.
I Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 4,5 (1971) (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
The bases for evidentiary exclusion -termed Beweisverwertungsverbote in Germany 6 -fall into two principal categories. The first is composed of two constitutional doctrines, the Rechtsstaatsprinzip and the Verhdltnismdissigkeit. Evidence obtained by means of brutality or deceit must be excluded under the Rechtsstaatsprinzip (principle of a state governed by the rule of law) to preserve the purity of the judicial process. 7 If a German court determines that the evidence in question was not seized through brutality or deceit, it must then consider whether admission of the evidence would violate the constitutionally protected privacy interests of the defendant. Under the constitutional doctrine of Verhiltnismdssigkeit (principle of proportionality), German judges balance, on a case-by-case basis, the defendant's interests in privacy against the importance of the evidence and the seriousness of the offense charged.
In addition, various statutory provisions in the Code of Criminal Procedure concerning self-incrimination, wiretapping, and witness privileges require the exclusion of evidence under certain circumstances. Because these statutes are all founded on constitutional principles, they provide additional support for the assertion that otherwise competent and relevant evidence is excluded in Germany for constitutional reasons.
Classic Mismatch (pt. 2), 52 TEX. L. REv. 621 (1974) (discussing the exclusionary rule in civil cases in West Germany, Scotland, England, Canada, and the United States, and in criminal cases in the last three jurisdictions). 6 The term literally means "evidentiary use prohibition." It is employed in West Germany to cover all exclusions of evidence, including those based on competence or relevance. See, e.g., STRAFPROZESSORDNUNG [STPO] (Code of Criminal Procedure) § § [250] [251] (W. Ger.) . Unless otherwise indicated, translations of the Strafprozessordnung are from THE AMERICAN SERIES OF FOREIGN PENAL CODES: THE GERIMAN CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE (H. Niebler trans. 1965) . When those translations are out of date or, in rare cases, at variance with the author's view of how a particular passage should be rendered in English, the author's translation is offered and noted. In this Article, the term "exclusionary rule" is applied only to the exclusion of presumptively relevant and competent evidence on constitutional grounds. 12 (1979) . This focus on the "purity of the judicial process" is similar to the approach to due process taken by the United States Supreme Court in Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. I65 (1952). In that case, the Court excluded evidence -obtained by state law enforcement officials who forcibly pumped the defendant's stomach -on the ground that permitting the use of such evidence in court would "afford brutality the cloak of law." Id. at 173. The Rochin Court's focus on "conduct that shocks the conscience," id. at 172, was later modified in Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (i961), the decision that first applied the exclusionary rule to the states. Since Mapp, American courts have sought to determine whether a given search violates the detailed requirements of the fourth amendment as interpreted by the Supreme Court.
Despite this fundamental similarity between the functions of exclusionary rules in Germany and in the United States, however, the German rule serves ends that are quite different from those of its American counterpart. Most importantly, the principal focus of the German exclusionary decisions is not on deterrence, 8 as has become the case in the United States. 9 Even in cases in which violations of the Rechtsstaatsprinzip or of a specific statutory provision lead directly to exclusion, deterrence of future violations is not cited as the primary justification for the rule, though exclusion obviously has some influence on police conduct.'( This focus away from deterrence has a practical effect in exclusionary decisions involving the proportionality principle. When the police have not been guilty of brutality or deceit but have merely violated the rules of the Code of Criminal Procedure -by conducting a warrantless search when a warrant was mandated, for example -evidence will not be excluded on this basis alone. The criminal will not automatically go free simply because the constable has blundered." Rather, the court will attempt to strike the optimum balance between the protection of the defendant's constitutional rights and the interests of effective law enforcement, without regard to the legality of the search or 8 Deterrence could hardly be the principal concern of a system that permits the use of illegally seized evidence in many cases. Moreover, German courts do not cite deterrence of police misconduct as a justification for exclusion. See, e.g., supra note 7; infra pp. 1043-47, io62. 9 Although recent Supreme Court pronouncements suggest that the primary purpose of the American rule is deterrence of police misconduct, see, e.g., United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 347 (I974), earlier decisions by the Court focused directly on the need to avoid the appearance of granting judicial sanction to official misconduct by admitting illegally obtained evidence. When the exclusionary rule was first established in Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914) , for example, the Court maintained that the integrity of the federal courts should not be compromised by the use of illegally obtained evidence. GEO. L.J. 365, 376-78 (1981) .
This view was accepted by Chief Justice (then Judge) Burger in an article written in z964, in which he succinctly described the early emphasis of the American exclusionary rule on the "purity of the judicial process": "The Weeks holding . . . rested on the Court's unwillingness to give even tacit approval to official defiance of constitutional provisions by admitting evidence secured in violation of the Constitution. seizure. 12 As a result, the essential question in American suppression hearings -did the police break the rules? 13 -does not figure in the calculus of German courts.14 This balancing approach has led many American commentators to conclude that there is no exclusionary rule in Germany. As noted above, however, the reality is considerably more complex. This Article analyzes the character of the various German exclusionary rules in an effort to demonstrate that the American approach cannot be dismissed as a mere 12 An American court will necessarily apply a balancing test to determine whether a search or seizure is "reasonable," but this test collapses the questions of legality and admissibility and answers them simultaneously. Unlike their German counterparts, who will admit evidence that they concede was illegally obtained, American judges are constrained to find that evidence was procured legally as a condition of admitting it. See, e.g., United States v. Ceccolini, 435 U.S. 268, 278 (1978) (voluntary testimony held not to be "fruit of the poisonous tree"); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. I, 27 (1968) (stop and frisk held to be legal). The Supreme Court has once upheld the use of evidence seized pursuant to an ordinance later declared unconstitutional, but it took pains to rule that the police action was legal under the circumstances. Michigan v. De Fillipo, 443 U.S. 31, 37 (i979). At procedural stages other than suppression hearings, the Court has been more willing to engage in balancing, but the balance weighs deterrent effects, not the degree of infringement of privacy. See, e.g., United States v. Havens, 446 U.S. 62o, 626-28 (I98O) (permitting admission of illegally obtained evidence for impeachment purposes); Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 492-95 (1976) (balancing the "incremental deterrent effect" against "costs to other values vital to a rational system of criminal justice" in holding that convictions obtained by use of evidence gathered in violation of the fourth amendment are not ordinarily open to habeas corpus attack).
Even the good faith exception of United States v. Williams, 622 F.2d 830 ( 5 th Cir. I98O) (en banc), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1127 (I98I), does not go as far as the German approach, because the Germans do not consider the good faith of the police to be relevant. See Project: Criminal Procedure, 71 GEO. L.J. 339, 436-37 (1982) .
But see Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387, 420-27 (I977) (Burger, C.J., dissenting) (urging that a balancing test apply to permit admission of evidence when police misconduct is not "egregious").
13 The focus of American courts that have adopted the "good faith" exception to the exclusionary rule, see, e.g., United States v. Williams, 622 F.2d 830, 833 ( 5 th Cir. i98o) (en banc) (opinion of Politz, J.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1127 (1981) , is essentially the same. These courts also profess a deterrence rationale for exclusion, but note that "a 'police officer will not be deterred from an illegal search if he does not know that it is illegal."' Id. at 842 (quoting Wright, Must the Criminal Go Free if the Constable Blunders?, 5o TEX. L. REV. 736, 740 (972) ).
14 Three German courts, which are similar to American appellate courts, hear appeals for error and issue written opinions: the Oberlandesgericht (OLG) (high state court), of which there are ii (one for each state) and which is the rough equivalent of a state supreme court; the Bundesgerichtshof (BGH) (high federal court or federal court of appeals), of which there is only one, divided into a civil and a criminal panel; and the Bundesverfassungsgericht (BVerfG) (federal constitutional court). There is no real equivalent to the United States Supreme Court; its function is divided between the BVerfG and the BGH. Under this division, the final interpretation of federal statutes (including the Code of Criminal Procedure) lies with the BGH, and the final interpretation of the constitution lies with the BVerfG.
aberration from universally accepted norms of law enforcement. In addition, an understanding of the operation of the German exclusionary rules may serve to broaden current debate by suggesting possible alternatives to the form the rule now takes in the United States.
I. EXCLUSION BASED ON CONSTITUTIONAL PRINCIPLES
The German Constitution (the Basic Law, or Grundgesetz) offers a solid foundation for the protection of individual liberty. Article i affirms as a fundamental principle that "the dignity of man is inviolable. To respect and protect it is the duty of all state authority."' 5 Article 2 establishes that "everyone has the right to the free development of his personality."
16 More specifically, article io provides that "secrecy of the mail as well as secrecy of the postal service and telecommunications is inviolable. Restrictions may be ordered only on the basis of law."
17 Likewise, article 13 states that "the home is inviolable" and that "searches may be ordered only by a judge. "' i8 In the United States, the broad provisions of the Constitution are fleshed out primarily by judicial holdings that establish, for example, what constitutes an "unreasonable search" or an "involuntary confession."
19 In Germany, as in all civil law countries, this task is performed by the legislature in a lengthy Code of Criminal Procedure -the Strafprozessordnungthat contains detailed provisions governing all phases of the criminal justice process and is applicable throughout the country. Theoretically, the courts clear up doubts concerning Code provisions only on a case-by-case basis, and their decisions have no precedential value. In practice, however, German courts rely on, distinguish, and overrule their prior opinions much as courts do in a common law jurisdiction. Ger. 1949 Ger. , amended 1973 [It] affords a fair trial before a legally appointed and independent judge in which constitutional guarantees are observed; specifically the dignity of the person, the right to free development of the personality, the freedom of the person, the equality before the law. . . as well as the prohibition against inhumane treatment. The right to a fair procedure also guarantees the accused the right to free counsel in serious cases if he can't afford to pay .... 28 The Rechtsstaatsprinzip forbids police brutality and deceit both in the seizure of evidence 29 . The German Code also provides that the judge, the prosecutor, a municipal official (not a police officer), or "two members of the municipality" must be present at searches "if possible," STPO § 105(HI), and that the occupant is entitled to be present as well; if the occupant is absent, a representative shall be called "if possible." Id. § xo6(I). If police do not comply with this section -in other words, if it is possible to obtain witnesses and the police do not -the subject of the search has a legal right to resist the search and exercise self-defense, but police failure to comply with this provision will not result in exclusion of the evidence seized. See i LOWE-ROSENBERG, supra note 24, § 105, 12 (citing cases). After a search, the person affected must be informed in writing of the reason for the search, and a list of things seized or a certificate that nothing incriminating was found must be issued on demand. STPO § 1o7. There are also detailed restrictions with regard to the treatment of private papers. See id. § § 97, 11o.
26 See infra pp. 1040-41, 1046. The contrast with American search and seizure law is striking. Searches may be performed on mere "suspicion," rather than probable cause, and a written search warrant is frequently not used at all in Germany. Most significantly for the purposes of this Article, violation of a search order requirement or failure to provide the required information does not lead to the exclusion of evidence derived from the search.
27 The Rechtsstaatsprinzip derives from article 20 of the Basic Law, which provides that "[legislation shall be subject to the constitutional order; the executive and the judiciary shall be bound by law and justice. " GG art. 20, para. 3. 28 T. KLEINKNECHT Although evidence must be excluded if the seizure itself was in violation of the Rechtsstaatsprinzip, 32 regardless of its probative value or the seriousness of the crime under investigation, 33 the practical effect of this broad exclusion is limited by the fact that the German courts analyze searches and seizures separately. Thus, in a case in which a search order violated the Rechsstaatsprinzip because it failed to specify the crime being investigated and the evidence sought, this constitutional defect alone did not lead to suppression of the evidence seized pursuant to the order. 34 Instead, the seizure was evaluated independently of the illegal search to determine whether it had been accomplished through brutality or deceit. 35 The court reasoned that the question of the validity of the search itself was not properly presented, 3 6 because the seizure was the actual source of the evidence. 35 Id. at 371-72; see infra p. io46. In this case, the seizure was held unconstitutional for essentially the same reason for which the search was held unconstitutional: the police were not investigating a specific crime, and a "fishing expedition" could not justify an action as intrusive as the seizure of the private medical records of a drug rehabilitation clinic. If, however, the police had found illegal narcotics rather than merely medical records, it is likely that the evidence would not have been suppressed, despite the defects in the search; in deciding in favor of exclusion, the court placed great emphasis on the private nature of the evidence seized. 36 Accord Judgment of May 26, 1976, BVerfG, 42 BVerfG 212, 218. In this earlier case, the court did not conclude that it would never exclude evidence on the basis of an illegal search, but found that the issue was not ripe.
37 See Judgment of May 24, 1977, BVerfG, 44 BVerfG at 383-84. In view of the fact that the German Constitution guarantees the inviolability of the home -GG art. 13; see Judgment of May 26, 1976, BVerfG, 42 BVerfG at 219 -this distinction makes little sense. Breaking down the door of a house to find evidence is certainly as serious an intrusion as snatching the evidence from the defendant's hand. Because the German system provides alternate grounds to exclude evidence, however, this distinction does not create as much mischief in Germany as it might in the United States. This point is illustrated by the Supreme Court's decision in Irvine v. California, 347 U.S. 128 (1954) . When police broke into the defendant's home and installed a microphone, the Court condemned the police behavior as a flagrant violation of the fourth amendment, id. at 132, but declined to exclude the evidence (the conversations [Vol. 96:1O32 tional seizures will lead directly to suppression, 38 whereas unconstitutional searches and merely illegal seizures (those that violate the rules of criminal procedure) will not necessarily have that effect.
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The second relevant constitutional principle is that of Verhiiltnismdssigkeit (principle of proportionality).
40
Under this doctrine, the methods used in fighting crime must be proportional to the "seriousness of the offense and the strength of the suspicion" 4 1 as well as to the constitutional interests at stake; thus, what would be appropriate in some cases may not be justifiable in others. The courts also employ a form of "least drastic means" analysis when assessing police actions under the principle of proportionality: if less intrusive measures will suffice, a greater intrusion will not be permitted.
42 This approach is illustrated by the federal constitutional court's Judgment of June io, I963, 4 3 in which the taking of spinal fluid from a suspect to determine his possible insanity, though generally authorized by the Code of Criminal Procedure, 4 4 was held to be out of proportion to the misdemeanor charge against the suspect. BVerfG 194. 44 A physical examination of the accused may be ordered for the ascertainment of facts, which are important for the proceeding. For this purpose the taking of blood samples and other penetrations of the body, made by a physician pursuant to the rules of medical science . . . are permissible without the consent of the accused, provided no resulting detriment to his health is to be feared.
STPO § 8ia.
45 Judgment of June io, 1963, BVerfG, x6 BVerfG at 202. Because this case arose on appeal from the order authorizing examination, the evidence was never obtained, and the question of suppression was not directly addressed. See also Judgment of Aug. 5, 1966, BVerfG, 2o BVerfG 62, 187 (holding that search of a press room German courts therefore engage in a two-step analysis when addressing constitutionally based challenges to the use of evidence. First, the court determines whether the evidence at issue was seized or obtained in violation of the Rechtsstaatsprinzip. In cases in which there is a violation, the judiciary must exclude the evidence to preserve the purity of the judicial process (Reinheit des Verfahrens).
4 6 If the evidence is not excluded in the first step, the court then considers the principle of Verhiltnismlissigkeit (proportionality). Weighing the appropriate factors, the court decides whether to use the evidence in question. If the court determines that the individual privacy rights of the accused outweigh the societal interest in the presentation of all relevant evidence, 4 7 the evidence will be excluded -without considering whether the police originally obtained the evidence legally.
The mechanics of the German system are demonstrated by three cases in which the courts excluded a diary, 48 a tape recording of a private conversation, 4 9 and the files of a drug rehabilitation clinic 5o on the ground that use of the evidence in court would violate the privacy rights of the defendant. The courts reached these results even though the legality of the seizures was conceded in the first two cases. In the Diary Case, 5 s the federal court of appeals considered whether the defendant's diary was properly admissible in a perjury trial. The police had been given the diary by the wife of the defendant's paramour, in whose home it had been concealed. Applying the balancing test required by the principle of proportionality, the court reversed the defendant's conviction on the ground that using the defendant's private diary against her in court violated her privacy rights under articles i and 2 of the constitution.
5 2 The court emphasized, however, that the mere requires a higher standard of cause than do other searches; such a search "must promise success in producing appropriate evidence," rather than be grounded on mere suspicion.)
46 But see Rogall, supra note 7, at i, 12 (discussing and criticizing the focus on the purity-of-the-process doctrine).
47 See generally i LOWE-ROSENBERG, supra note 24, Einleitung ch. 14, I
(observing that the search for truth in criminal investigations is limited by the commands of justice, which forbid investigatory means that "are unreasonable, violate the proportionality principle, offend human dignity, or are not related to the development of truth," and claiming that "[t]he exclusionary rules serve the purpose of enforcing these interests"). This case illustrates some of the differences between the operation of exclusionary rules in Germany and in the United States. In the United States, the diary would have been admissible because it was obtained without police misconduct, 55 whereas a gun obtained pursuant to a defective search warrant would have been excluded. 5 6 In contrast, the diary was excluded in Germany, whereas an illegally seized gun would be admissible because its use would not interfere with the free development of the defendant's personality. Only a brutal or deceitful seizure that violated the defendant's most fundamental constitutional rights under the Rechsstaatsprinzip would result in exclusion of a gun. A diary is subject to different treatment, however, because its use in court constitutes a harsh court reached this result even though the exclusionary provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure -for example, STPO § 136a, which excludes coerced confessions -were not applicable, see infra pp. 1049-62, and thereby prepared the way for the subsequent expansion of the exclusionary rule based on the broad constitutional principles discussed above. The basic concept of exclusion, however, is not a new one in Germany; it was first set forth in 19o3. E. BELING incursion on an individual's personal privacy, whether or not it was legally obtained.
By excluding a legally seized diary but holding that diaries or other private personal papers may be used as evidence in prosecutions of more serious crimes, the court in the Diary Case gave the police little guidance in deciding when such documents should be seized. As the case indicated, the admissibility of all evidence -unless seized in violation of the Rechtsstaatsprinzip or a statute requiring exclusion -is open to consideration by the court, which decides on an ad hoc basis whether to admit or exclude. Thus, the purpose of the German exclusionary rule is clearly not to deter police misconduct. 5 7 Instead, through balancing, the rule operates to maximize privacy interests consistently with society's interest in prosecuting serious crimes.
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The dimensions of this protected sphere of personal privacy were further clarified in Judgment of January 31, I973, 59 in which the federal constitutional court first employed a threetiered analysis (Dreistufentheorie) 60 to determine whether evidence must be excluded because of its intrusive effect. A married couple, the B's, sold residential and business property to the defendant. The defendant arranged with the B's to understate the actual price on the contract so that the property would be valued at a lower figure for tax purposes. The defendant paid the difference (70,000 DM) to the B's in cash. Unknown to the defendant, the B's had tape-recorded some of the conversations relating to this tax fraud; they subsequently turned over the tapes to the police on their own ini- (1977) . Dencker notes that some scholars contend that the rule should have a deterrent purpose, id. at 52 n.169, but concludes that it "is not possible to assume that the legislature created the 'evidence use prohibitions' for disciplinary reasons ....
The disciplinary effect is only a welcome ancillary effect of the 'evidence use prohibitions' that are in existence for other reasons." Id. at 53, 55. The privacy interests of the defendant did not automatically outweigh all other factors; instead, as in the Diary Case, they were subjected to a balancing process (Abwdgung). The court concluded that the interests of the state in this case were not sufficiently strong to permit use of the tapes, 6 7 but cautioned that the result might have been different had the defendant been charged with a crime of violence rather than with tax fraud.
68
The court also outlined the scope of the third level of protection, which is applicable in all cases in which the private personality of the defendant is not revealed by the evidence in question. Because the defendant's privacy rights would not be violated by its admission, evidence falling into this category -such as a tape recording of a business meeting -could 63 Judgment of Jan. 31, 1973, BVerfG, 34 BVerfG at 245. 64 Id. (citing GG art. i, para. i ("The dignity of man is inviolable. To respect it and protect it is the duty of all state authority."); id. art. 2, para. x ("Everyone has a right to free development of his personality, insofar as he does not infringe upon the rights of others or offend against the constitutional order or the moral code."); id. art. i9, para. 2 ("In no case may a basic right be infringed upon in its essential context.")). 246-47. 67 Id. at 248. This case arose when a public prosecutor sought a court order approving the seizure of documents. Id. at 242. The defendant appealed the order, and the case eventually reached the federal constitutional court. The court refused to admit the tapes as evidence, but did not prohibit the introduction of documents that were seized as a consequence of the delivery of the tapes to the police. Thus, the court did not bar the use of the questioned evidence as an investigatory tool, but only its direct use as evidence at trial.
68 Id. at 248. never be excluded under the proportionality principle. 69 The court reasoned that the conversation in the case before it was not such an unprotected matter, because only three individuals, rather than a large group of people, were involved.70
In the two cases discussed above, the German courts engaged in an exercise foreign to American courts -excluding legally seized evidence on the ground that the evidence itself was too private to be used.
7 1 The federal constitutional court extended this reasoning in Judgment of May 24, 1977,72 which involved the search and seizure of the medical records of a narcotics rehabilitation clinic. First, in declaring the search unconstitutional under the Rechtsstaatsprinzip, 73 the court noted that the search order failed to specify any particular crime as the subject of the investigation, to name any particular defendant, or to identify the evidence sought. Instead, the court found, the search was a fishing expedition for narcotics violations that might exist at the clinic.
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The court's conclusion that the search was unconstitutional did not resolve the question whether the evidence could be used. Resolution of the exclusion issue depended on a finding either that the seizure was unconstitutional or that, balancing all the relevant factors, the privacy interests of the defendant outweighed the state's interest in using the evidence.
7 5 Because the seizure was not accomplished through brutality or deceit, and consequently did not violate the Rechtsstaatsprinzip, the court turned to the three sublevels of analysis used 69 Id. at 247. In a subsequent case, the court called this third level the "allgemeine Handlungsfreiheit," or general freedom to act. Judgment of May 24, 1977, BVerfG, 44 BVerfG 353, 372-73. That is, one is free to hold business meetings, for example, but the discussions are not entitled to special constitutional protection.
70 Judgment of Jan. 31, 1973, BVerfG, 34 BVerfG at 247. Actually, the court said that the "conversation took place under six eyes." Id.
71 But see Boyd v. United States, i6 U.S. 616, 630 (i886). In Boyd, the Court ordered the suppression of private papers on the ground that such evidence, by its nature, was too private to be used. The Boyd Court also found, however, that the means by which the evidence was obtained (a summons) was illegal. under the proportionality principle. The court held that the evidence in question, the medical records of the clinic's patients, fell into the second category of the Dreistufentheorie, the Privatbereich. 76 After weighing the competing interests of society in criminal prosecutions and of the individual in the development of his personality, the court noted that society also has a strong interest in encouraging people to seek treatment for narcotics addiction and other health problems. 77 The court concluded that this interest was a sufficient basis for exclusion of the medical records. 78 Once again, however, the court cautioned that in an investigation of serious crimesor in a properly limited search for specific narcotics violations -seizure and use of such records might be appropriate.
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Although these cases leave vague the boundaries of the various theories of exclusion, several significant points do emerge. The most notable is that deterrence of police misconduct is not the primary goal of the German exclusionary rules.
Even when evidence is excluded because its seizure involved police brutality, the principal justification for exclusion is not to punish the police, but to maintain the integrity of the judicial process.
8 0 Similarly, under the proportionality principle, the BVerfG, 44 BVerfG at 372 (criticizing not the police, whom the court considered out of its control, but the judge who issued the warrant). That deterrence of police misconduct is not the focus of the German decisions is further illustrated by Judgment of Mar. 17, 1971, BGH, 24 BGHSt 125, in which the federal court of appeals held that a blood sample taken from the defendant by a medical assistant on instructions of the police -in violation of § 8ia of the Code of Criminal Procedure, which requires a doctor to take blood samples, STPO § 8ia -could be used as evidence in a case involving drunken driving. The court concluded that the damage to the defendant's right of physical inviolability, see GG art. 2, para. 2, had already been done. It noted that admission of the evidence thus obtained would not further intrude on the defendant's body, that blood alcohol percentage was not a private matter, and that consequently there was no point in exclusion. Judgment of Mar. 17, x971, BGH, 24 BGHSt at 131. The court held that such evidence could be excluded only if it were obtained in such an outrageous fashion -for example, through deliberate deceit (in this case, the police did not realize that
1983]
mere fact that a search violates the Code of Criminal Procedure is not determinative; the important question is whether the degree of intrusion upon the defendant's privacy rights can be justified in view of the nature of the offense charged. Although the German system admittedly offers less protection for civil liberties than does the American exclusionary rule, it also avoids the most objectionable feature of the American system -that a confessed murderer may be allowed to go free because of an error by the police -and may therefore command a greater degree of public sympathy and support.
The emphasis that these three cases place on protecting the privacy rights of criminal defendants from infringement in the courtroom -as opposed to deterring future police misconduct -results in a number of interesting divergences between American and German evidentiary doctrine. For example, evidence delivered to the police by private individuals may be suppressed in Germany if its admission in court would impinge on individual privacy. 8 ' The Germans do not distinguish between private actions and police actions in this regard; the primary concern is the effect of using the evidence in court, not how it became available. In the United States, on the other hand, privately obtained evidence is admissible even if it has been acquired by means that would result in exclusion if employed by law enforcement officials. 82 This difference in perspective is also reflected by the differing attitudes of American and German courts toward the admissibility of audio and video recordings. As a result of their concern with preserving the defendant's privacy rights, German courts tend to view such evidence with a certain amount of uneasiness, although this disfavor will not always result in exclusion. 8 3 American courts, on the other hand, have applauded the use of this type of evidence because of its unusually high probative value. 
I. EXCLUSION BASED ON STATUTES
The exclusionary principles discussed in Part I are based directly on the German Constitution, not on the Code of Criminal Procedure; the Code does not require exclusion as a supplement to any of the general rules regarding searches and seizures. Other provisions of the Code, 8 6 however, contain specific exclusionary rules that prohibit the use in court of any evidence obtained through violation of those provisions. Although these provisions are statutory, they are nevertheless "constitutional" in character; each prohibition was established to protect specific constitutional rights. Thus, like the American exclusionary rule, these provisions operate to exclude otherwise competent and relevant evidence that is obtained through violations of constitutional rights. Because these statutory prohibitions operate more automatically than the judicial "balancing" doctrines discussed in Part I, they may be more effective in discouraging police misconduct. Any deterrent effect, however, is incidental to the fundamental purpose of protecting the privacy and dignity of the individual.
A. Coerced Confessions
The most explicit German exclusionary rule is stated in section 136a of the Code of Criminal Procedure, which provides as follows:
I. The freedom of the accused to determine and to exercise his will shall not be impaired by ill-treatment, by fatigue, by physical interference, by dispensing medicines, by torture, by deception or by hypnosis. This provision is based on the constitutional principles that "the dignity of man is inviolable" 8 8 and that "everyone has the right to the free development of his personality." '8 9 It has been applied to exclude evidence in a wide variety of situations -a case in which the accused confessed after being arrested at 5:oo a.m. and deprived of sleep for thirty hours, 90 for example, and another in which the police confronted the accused with the corpse of the victim (the accused's own threeyear-old son) to induce him to make a statement.
91 Section 136a also forbids the use of lie detectors. 92 Moreover, in combination with another section of the Code, section x36a prohibits the introduction of evidence obtained from witnesses by means that would violate section i36a if used against the accused.
93 If, however, the accused or the witness freely chooses to repeat a statement originally obtained in violation of the statute, the second statement may be used as evidence.
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Because it is an automatic rule of exclusion, section i36a does not permit the balancing of criminal justice considerations and privacy interests that is possible under the principle of proportionality. Instead, all evidence obtained in violation of the statute must be excluded, regardless of its probative value or the seriousness of the case. Not surprisingly, the courts have taken a narrow view of the scope of this provision. To date, no fruit-of-the-poisonous-tree doctrine (Fernwirkungseffekt) attaches to section i36a violations, and illegally obtained 87 STPO § 136a (emphasis added). Although the specific terms of § 136a apply only to examination of the accused in court, § 163a(III)-(IV) of the Code extends § 136a to examination by police and prosecutors. 88 GG art. 1, para. leads and clues may be used to uncover admissible evidence.
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Section 136a also does not apply to statements or confessions made to third parties (Drittwirkung) unless those parties were acting at the instigation of the police. 9 6 Finally, the doctrine of in dubio pro reo (all doubts resolved in favor of the defendant) is not applicable to alleged section 136a violations.
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The prohibitions of section 136a are widely accepted in Germany, and the police generally strive to obey them. A companion provision, however, has spawned considerably more controversy. Section 136 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, like the Miranda doctrine in the United States, 9 " provides that "[i]t shall be pointed out to [the accused] that the law grants him the right to respond to the accusation, or not to answer regarding the charge, and at all times, even before his examination, to consult with defense counsel of his choice." 9 9 One of the more glaring examples of the courts' reluctance to enforce this rule is Judgment of April 30, 1968. 100
The defendant in that case, suspected of vehicular homicide, was unable to speak because of a jaw injury. He was nevertheless questioned in a hospital the day after the accident and made incriminating statements in writing without having been advised of his section 136 rights. The writing was not used in court, but a policeman testified to the defendant's declarations. 10 ' The federal appeals court concluded after discussion that the legislature did not intend the absolute exclusionary rule of section 136a to apply to a violation of section 136, and thus a police violation of the latter would not result in exclu- 96 See i LOwE-ROSENBERG, supra note 24, § i36a, 6 (citing cases). This decision was the subject of considerable criticism in the legal literature, 1 0 3 and the court subsequently reconsidered the issue in a different context. In Judgment of May 14, 1974, 104 the federal appeals court held that the failure of a judge to instruct the defendant of his right not to testify at trial, an instruction required by section 243(IV) of the Code, ' 0 5 constituted reversible error. 10 6 The court placed the burden of proof on the defendant, however, to show that he had intended not to speak and that he had spoken only out of ignorance of his right to remain silent.' 0 7 The court distinguished its earlier holding on the ground that the rules that govern testimony at trial are not necessarily applicable to pretrial procedures, and asserted that the earlier case was still good law.' 0 8 Some commentators have termed this distinction highly illogical and have suggested that the opinion should be interpreted to extend some aspects of the section 136a exclusionary rule to violations of section 136.109 The courts have not considered the decision to mandate this result, however, and as a consequence the police continue to question suspects without warning them of their rights." 0 clear that the federal appeals court, the final arbiter of statutory interpretation, is prepared to go this far.
103 See C. ROXIN, supra note 25, at 129 (citing authorities). 104 BGH, 25 BGHSt 325. 10$ Section 2 4 3 (IV) of the Code provides that, at trial, "the defendant will be informed that he may, but need not, respond to the public charge." STPO § 243(m). 106 It is the normal practice at a German trial to question the defendant about his personal background before advising him of his right to silence. In this case, the defendant was charged with vehicular homicide. During the questions about his background, he related that he had previously been convicted of drunken driving, and the court relied on this admission in its written judgment. Unlike the American system, in which the basis of the jury verdict of "guilty" or "not guilty" remains unexplained, the German system requires the judgment to set forth in detail the facts and law that form the basis of acquittal or conviction., STPO § 267; see infra pp. io63-64.
107 Judgment of May 14, 1974, BGH, 25 BGHSt at 331-32. In certain misdemeanor cases, the defendant need not be represented by counsel. See STPO § 140. Presumably, in cases in which he is represented, it will be difficult for the defendant to succeed in claiming ignorance of his right to silence. The instant case was decided on an abstract question of law and did not reach the issue whether the defendant had actually been ignorant of his right to silence.
This widespread disregard of a specific command of the Code of Criminal Procedure 11 by the police raises an interesting point about the exclusionary rule. In the United States, where the rule is applied to violations of the Miranda requirements, police generally carry and use a "Miranda rights card" 11 2 -even though American police are thought to be I At least one American scholar has written that the German courts exclude fewer types of evidence than do American courts because German police officers are more effectively deterred from misconduct by sanctions of their supervisors and investigatory bodies; consequently, a judicially imposed exclusionary penalty is not needed in Germany. See J. LANGBEIN, supra note 2, at 69. It is undoubtedly true that German police resort to brutality less than their American counterparts do (in part because they are confronted with less) and have a better relationship with the citizenry than is typical in the United States. Nevertheless, when it comes to following the rules governing police conduct as set forth by the legislature and the courts, empirical research suggests that the German police "are as willing as their American counterparts to disregard laws and regulations if it appears necessary to 'do the job. ' One study found that 65% of German police officers agreed that police work cannot be performed properly if officers always adhere to the letter of the law. Hinz, Das Berufs-und Gesellschaftsbild von Polizisten, in DIE POLIZEI: SOZIOLOGISCHE STUDIEN UND FORSCHUNGSBERICHTE 122, 141 (J. Feest & R. Lautmann eds. 1971). Hinz also found the "police world view" to be that "there are a lot of people in the world who enjoy the protection of constitutional rights who don't deserve them." Hinz, Soziale Determinanten des 'polizeilichen Betriebs,' in DIE POLIZEI: EINE IN-STITUTION OFFENTLICHER GEWALT 135, 144 (Arbeitskreis Junger Kriminologen ed. 1975) . Another study found that the police regard constitutional rights of the accused as "impediments" to the efficient performance of their duties, impediments to be "gotten around" whenever possible. W. STEFFEN, ANALYSE POLIZEILICHER ER-
MITTLUNGSTATIGKEIT AUS DER SICHT DES SPATEREN STRAFVERFAHRENS 190 (1976).
The impression gained by the author in interviews with prosecutors, defense attorneys, and judges is that police discipline is effective in punishing police who are corrupt or who beat up suspects (and that, consequently, these problems occur infrequently in Germany) but that it has no effect on conduct such as failing to warn suspects of their constitutional rights or conducting overly broad searches. Indeed, such police conduct is apparently rather widespread in Germany and seems to be encouraged by the police hierarchy. See id. at i88-9o; sources cited supra note Io.
112 The author makes these observations about police behavior on the basis of his experience as an Assistant United States Attorney in Washington, D.C. See also Hearings, supra note 3, at 38 (prepared statement of Stephen H. Sachs, Attorney General of Maryland) (discussing the day-to-day deterrent effect of the exclusionary rule through prosecutorial oversight of police activities). Similarly, as Professor LaFave points out, the deterrent effect of the exclusionary rule on police is certainly suggested by such post-exclusionary rule occurrences as the dramatic increase in the use of search warrants where virtually none had been used before, stepped-up efforts to educate the police on the law of search and seizure where such training had before been virtually nonexistent, and the creation and development of working relationships between police and prosecutors to security has been or is being committed." 9 The Gio law contains a specific exclusionary rule providing that evidence obtained through wiretapping may be used only in the investigation and prosecution of one of these crimes. 120 Wiretaps for law enforcement purposes may be performed under section iooa of the Code of Criminal Procedure when there are "definite facts on which to base the suspicion"' 121 that one of a number of specified crimes has been committed. 122 Although this part of the statute does not contain an explicit exclusionary rule, it is settled that, as is true of the Gio law, evidence obtained by wiretap may be used only to prosecute one of the listed offenses. 1
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The German courts have held that the wiretap statutes are subject to a stringent exclusionary rule, including a version of the fruit-of-the-poisonous-tree doctrine. They have reasoned that the authorities must be held to the letter of the law because, except as specifically provided by statute, the constitutional prohibition of wiretapping remains firm. Ambiguous cases tend to be resolved in favor of the continuing vitality of the constitutional provision. 124 An example of this judicial firmness is Judgment of February 22, 1978, 125 in which the federal appeals court considered the presumptively legal wiretap of A, who was suspected of participating in a criminal conspiracy (a listed offense under section iooa of the Code). The tape revealed only evidence of a nonlisted crime. A was arrested; the tape was played; and A confessed. He repeated 119 1968 BGBI, Gio, art. 1, § 2, at 949. This list has been strongly criticized for overbreadth. See Carr, supra note 16, at 614 (citing authorities).
120 1968 BGBI, Gio, art. I, § 7(3), at 95o. This paragraph further provides that, if after a wiretap has been undertaken to investigate one of the listed crimes, evidence is obtained of certain other serious crimes (listed in § 138 of the Criminal Code, STRAFGESETZBUCtI [STGB] (Criminal Code) § 138 (W. Ger.)), this evidence may also be used. Carr is thus incorrect in his assertion that "the German wiretapping statutes contain no provisions regulating either the admissibility of conversations recorded by wiretapping or defining the extent to which or circumstances in which recorded conversations or derivative evidence may be or become inadmissible," Carr, supra note ix6, at 638. 121 STPO § iooa (translation of the author). Note the difference between the standards for a search warrant ("A search may be made . . . if it may be presumed that such search will lead to the discovery of evidence." STPO § 102), an intelligence wiretap ("a factual basis for suspicion," 1968 BGB1, Gio, art. i, § 2, at 949), and a law enforcement wiretap ("definite facts on which to base the suspicion," STPO § iooa (translation of the author)). This last standard appears to be similar to probable cause.
122
The listed crimes include counterfeiting, narcotics offenses, and murder. STPO § iooa (translation of the author). 
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the confession before a judge and affirmed that no pressure had been brought on him to confess. 126 Nevertheless, the appellate court not only excluded the tapes themselves, but also excluded both confessions as, in effect, direct fruits of the poisonous tree. The court limited the reach of its holding, however, by observing that, although an interrogation could not be based on improper evidence, clues obtained from a wiretap could be used for further investigation, even of nonlisted offenses. 1
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This narrow view of the fruit-of-the-poisonous-tree doctrine was subsequently expanded in a case involving the news magazine Der Spiegel. 1 28 Der Spiegel had published an article on the surveillance of an atomic physicist by the federal Office of Constitutional Protection. 12 9 The article was based largely on leaked government files, and suspicion concerning the source of the leaks fell on a journalist, F, who was a former employee of the Office. A Gio wiretap was ordered on F's phone on the basis of suspicion of anticonstitutional sabotage,1 3 0 a listed offense under the statute. Monitored conversations led law enforcement officials to believe that F had hidden incriminating documents at his sister's home. A search order was obtained; the home was searched; and incriminating documents from the Office of Constitutional Protection were found and seized. Unfortunately for the authorities, these documents in-126 Id. at 356. The second confession would therefore have been admissible had this case involved a violation of STPO § 136a.
127 Judgment of Feb. 22, 1978, BGH, 27 BGHSt at 357-58. In the United States, in contrast, the fruit-of-the-poisonous-tree doctrine would require not only that a confession obtained by confronting the defendant with illegally acquired evidence be suppressed, but also that use of any clues gathered by illegal police practices be forbidden.
The "fruit of the poisonous tree" doctrine is in no sense limited to cases in which there has been a violation of the Fourth Amendment. It has been utilized with respect to other kinds of constitutional violations as well, such as unconstitutionally conducted lineups and unconstitutionally obtained confessions. It has also been employed where the secondary evidence was derived from violation of non-constitution limitations that are commonly implemented by an exclusionary rule, such as statutory restrictions upon wiretapping and the McNabb-Mallory rule regarding prompt production of a federal arrestee before a magistrate.
3 W. LAFAvE, supra note 112, § 114, at 613-14 (footnotes omitted).
128 Judgment of Apr. i8, r98o, BGH, 29 BGHSt 244. Because German case names do not include party names, cases are referred to by informal names. Thus, the case involving the seizure of the diary, Judgment of Feb. 21, 1964, BGH, i9 BGHSt 325, discussed at supra pp. 1042-44, is referred to as "the Diary Case." Because it involved the news magazine Der Spiegel, this case is referred to by that name.
129 The German Office of Constitutional Protection, or Bundesverfassungsschutzamt, is similar to the Federal Bureau of Investigation in the United States but has more limited powers.
130 STGB § 88.
criminated F only with respect to certain lesser crimes not listed in the Gio law. 13 1 He was convicted of a lesser offense on the basis of these documents. On appeal, the court assumed arguendo that the original wiretap was legal, 132 and observed that evidence obtained directly from the wiretap could not be used to prosecute a nonlisted crime. In this case, however, the evidence was obtained indirectly, through the use of clues received from the wiretap; no actual wiretap evidence was offered in court or used to extract a confession. Nevertheless, the court excluded the documents. It noted that the Gio law contains a specific exclusionary provision and touches on a basic constitutional right. 133
The courts have taken only a somewhat more permissive approach in cases involving the use of wiretap evidence against third parties. In Judgment of March 15, 1976, the federal court of appeals held that evidence obtained during a legal wiretap of B could be used against A (who was speaking to B's wife on the phone), even though there was no prior suspicion concerning A.
134 Although the courts have not dealt with a case in which a wiretap was ordered on the basis of insufficient evidence, the holding of the Spiegel case -that wiretap evidence must be excluded unless obtained strictly according to the terms of the statute -would presumably govern in this situation as well.
These decisions demonstrate that the lenient approach that the German courts normally take to police violations of search and seizure rules is abruptly discarded when wiretaps are involved. Because the wiretap statute carves out a limited exception to a specific constitutional prohibition, it must be strictly construed. Thus, even if the police conform to the precise terms of the statute in implementing a wiretap, any resulting evidence will be automatically excluded if it does not relate to a listed offense. This rigorous approach stands in 1968136 would not require exclusion if the challenged wiretap was reasonable on the whole.1 37 The Scott majority performed much as the German courts do in search and seizure cases: it found that a seizure (the wiretap) in violation of the applicable statutory rules was "reasonable" under the constitutional standard, and therefore held that exclusion was not necessary. 13 8 Thus, "technical" search and seizure violations result in exclusion in the United States, and "technical" wiretapping violations result in exclusion in Germany -but not vice versa. This distinction suggests that the decision to adopt a stringent exclusionary rule may reflect the relative importance of particular values within a given legal system. Although both the German and the American Constitutions contain explicit provisions guaranteeing the physical inviolability of the home, the comparative laxity of the requirements governing searches in the Code of Criminal Procedure -as well as the absence of an exclusionary remedy for violation of these rules -implies that German legislators and judges place a much lower value on protecting the security of the home than do their American counterparts. 1 3 9 Wiretapping, on the other hand, is appar-135 436 U.S. 128 (1978) . In Scott, virtually all of the petitioner's conversations over a one-month period were intercepted, although only 40% of the conversations related to narcotics.
136 Under American law, wiretaps must be "conducted in such a way as to minimize the interception of communications not otherwise subject to interception." 18 U.S.C. § 2518(5) (1976) .
137 436 U.S. at 138-39. In fact, the Supreme Court's approach in Scott resembles the German courts' balancing approach in search and seizure cases. The apparent anomaly -the American courts' engaging in a balancing exercise -may be partly explained by the fact that the German wiretap law contains an explicit exclusionary rule, whereas the law at issue in Scott did not. Nonetheless, the holding of the Supreme Court, that violation of a specific statutory command is not itself constitutionally unreasonable, is similar to the German approach in nonwiretap cases.
138 See also United States v. Caceres, 440 U. S. 741, 755-57 (1979) (holding that an electronic surveillance by the Internal Revenue Service, performed in violation of Service regulations, would not lead to suppression if the surveillance on the whole was "reasonable").
139 It is not readily apparent why the German courts do not emphasize the inviolability of the home. One possible explanation is that Germany is significantly more crowded than the United States. Because few of them live in single-family dwellings, Germans might have a lesser expectation of privacy in their homes than Americans do. Moreover, because Germans have more respect for the police (and a better disciplined police force), they might not be as disturbed as Americans are by the thought of police officers' looking through their homes for evidence.
ently regarded as a more serious intrusion upon individual rights in Germany than it is in the United States, as the specific proscription in the German Constitution suggests. Therefore, wiretapping is subject to a stricter exclusionary rule in the former country than in the latter.
C. Violations of the Rights of Witnesses
The German Code of Criminal Procedure also contains a series of rules protecting witnesses who enjoy a privileged personal or professional relationship with the accused. These privileges exist for the benefit of the witness and may be waived by him over the objection of the defendant.
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A failure by the authorities to advise the witness of his rights, however, will result in exclusion of any statement he has given, even though the statutes contain no explicit exclusionary provision.
14 1 Because these statutory rules explicate constitutional principles 4 2 and because their violation leads to the exclusion of otherwise competent and relevant evidence, they are appropriate for inclusion in this discussion. 12, 1922, 149 in which the court held that statements obtained during interrogation of the defendant's doctor, without advising him of his right to refuse to speak to the authorities, could be suppressed at trial on motion of the defen- 143 In addition, STPO § 8ic provides that a privileged person may also refuse a physical examination aimed at obtaining evidence against the accused. STPO § 8ic(III). Again, failure to warn the witness of his right to refuse will result in exclusion. See I LOWE-ROSENBERG, supra note 24, § 8ic, 61 (citing cases). All nonprivileged witnesses may be examined without their consent only to verify whether there is a specific trace or consequence of a punishable act on their body. STPO § 8ic(I).
144 STPO § 52(11). 145 Id. 146 The right to silence of a relative of the accused is a fundamental right of the relative founded on the Rechtsstaatsprinzip. Judgment of July 3, 1962, BGH, 17 BGHSt 337, 348. 147 Cf. MCCORMICK's HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE, supra note 140, § 8o, at 166 (marital privilege fails if any third party, including a child of the marriage who is old enough to understand, is present at the communication).
148 STPO § 53(I). The list also includes members of the Bundestag (the German parliament), tax advisers, accountants, pharmacists, and members of the media to whom the suspect might have given information. Section 53a(I) of the Code provides that the assistants of some of these people are also privileged. STPO § 53(a)(I). Hence a strict exclusionary rule, not specifically dictated by the statute, applies to exclude prior statements to the police, including those given with proper warnings, if the privileged person elects not to testify at trial. In contrast, the American system permits neither the defendant nor a privileged witness to prevent the admission of a statement obtained legally by the police.
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Further protection for the defendant's privacy is supplied by section 97, which provides that written communications between the accused and a privileged person are not subject to seizure.' 5 4 Although the testimonial privileges afforded by sections 52 and 53 specifically provide for the exclusion of relevant testimony, the provisions of section 97 contain no vigorously criticized. See, e.g., G6ssel, supra note 57, at 652-53. Nevertheless, the result -which amounts to a denial of standing -makes more sense in Germany, where the focus of exclusion is on shielding the privacy rights of the defendant, than it would in the United States, where the Supreme Court has asserted that the basis of the exclusionary rule is deterrence of police misconduct, see United States v. Calandra, 414 U. S. 338, 347-48 (1974) , and has nevertheless refused to deter such misconduct in certain cases in which it found that the defendant lacked standing. See, e.g., Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 133-38 (1978 
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The following objects are not subject to seizure: I. written communications between the accused and persons who may refuse testimony pursuant to § 52 or § 53, subs. I, clauses I to 3; 2. notes, made by persons specified in § 53, subs. I, clauses i to 3 concerning information confided to them by the accused, or concerning other circumstances to which their right to refuse testimony pertains; 3. other objects including records of medical examinations, covered by the privilege as to the persons mentioned in § 53, subs. I, clauses I to 3, to refuse testimony. STPO § 97(1). explicit exclusionary rule, and violation of a rule governing searches and seizures by the police does not necessarily lead to exclusion.' 5 5 Nevertheless, this protection gave rise to the initial judicially created exclusionary rule in Germany in 1889, some twenty-five years before the American rule was first enunciated in Weeks.1 5 6 In Judgment of November 7, 889,15 7 the defendant was charged with a crime that involved writing an anonymous letter. The police conducted a properly authorized search of the home of the defendant's parents and seized a letter from the defendant to his parents. The letter was admitted at trial simply as a handwriting exemplar, not for its content, and the defendant was convicted. Basing its decision on the prohibition of seizure of written communications between the accused and his relatives, the court reversed and held that such evidence not only could not be seized, but also could not be used at trial.'
5 8
The principal function of the exclusionary rules concerning witness privileges, like that of the other rules discussed above, is not to deter police misconduct, but to maintain a suitable balance between the defendant's privacy and relational rights and the state's interest in prosecuting crime. The courts' method of striking this balance is illustrated by Judgment of March 28, 1973,159 in which the federal appeals court held that evidence seized in violation of section 97 may be used at trial if it later develops that the owner of the documents in question was an accomplice of the defendant -even if the police were unaware of this fact at the time of the seizure. 160 Because privacy is the principal concern of the German system, the courts focus their attention on the known facts at the time of the most significant invasion of privacy -the time when the evidence is to be used at trial. A deterrence-oriented system, in contrast, would have excluded the evidence on the ground that the police acted wrongfully based on what they knew when the documents were originally seized. [Vol. 96:1032 verdict in writing and may be forced to acquit 168 -regardless of the court's own feelings about the defendant's guilt. If, however, the suppressed evidence is not obviously necessary to support a finding of guilt but is in reality the dispositive factor in the minds of the fact finders -as might be true with regard to a confession supported by sufficient, but not overwhelming, evidence -defendants who should have been acquitted may be convicted nonetheless. This weakness is not a function of the exclusionary rules themselves, however, but rather of the structure of the trial process in Germany.
IV. CONCLUSION
The case law and statutes discussed in this Article clearly establish that, contrary to the traditional view, Germany in fact has a well-developed system of exclusionary rules founded on constitutional principles and statutory provisions. The German and the American exclusionary rules both reflect the fundamental principle that relevant evidence must occasionally be excluded to safeguard constitutional rights, but the rules sometimes differ significantly in the scope of protection that they afford. The German rule, for example, is less stringent than the American rule in excluding evidence derived from improper searches of the home, and the failure to give Mirandatype warnings to suspects generally will not result in exclusion in Germany. On the other hand, in comparison to their American counterparts, the German courts afford significantly greater protection to witnesses with personal or professional ties to the defendant and are stricter in suppressing evidence obtained in violation of wiretapping statutes. The German courts have also defined a doctrine of personal privacy that will cause certain private material, such as diaries, to be excluded even when such material has been obtained legally. The two systems converge, however, in their treatment of coerced confessions and evidence obtained through brutality or deceit.
The mechanics of the German and American systems also reflect both similarities and differences. Germany's statutory exclusionary rules operate automatically, much like the American rule: if the police have violated the law, any resulting evidence will be excluded without regard to other considerations. In cases in which general constitutional principles are the basis for exclusion, however, the only police conduct that 168 Although such acquittals are unusual, they are not altogether unknown. See sources cited supra note iio. io64 [Vol. 96:1o32 leads to automatic exclusion in Germany is a seizure that violates the Rechtsstaatsprinzip through brutality or deceit. In all other situations, in dramatic contrast to the American system, the fact that evidence was legally or illegally obtained is not dispositive. The decision to admit or suppress will be determined by balancing the relative importance of the defendant's privacy rights against the seriousness of the offense charged.
Would some variant of the German system be workable and effective in the United States? Some aspects of the German system certainly offer an appealing contrast to the current operation of the American exclusionary rule. The German approach avoids the most serious objection to the American system -the release of dangerous criminals simply because of what frequently are technical blunders by law enforcement officials. In cases that do not involve a statutory exclusionary rule, neither mistakes by the police nor even intentional violations of the Code of Criminal Procedure automatically result in exclusion, particularly in cases involving serious crimes. Nonetheless, because evidence that is obtained through gross abuses -such as police conduct involving brutality or deceit -is excluded by the Rechtsstaatsprinzip, the German system avoids the other extreme as well -sacrificing fundamental constitutional rights in the name of "law and order." The German approach is also attractive because it recognizes the importance of preserving the defendant's privacy rights, even when the challenged evidence has been legally obtained. Finally, because the American fact finder is not made aware of excluded evidence, the concepts underlying the German system might operate more effectively under the American system than they do in Germany itself.
Of course, there would be serious problems with any attempt to adopt some variant of the German system for use in the United States. Whatever the deterrent effect on police misconduct of the American exclusionary rule, 1 6 9 the balancing approach employed by the German courts would have a lesser effect. The German system also reflects a comparative indifference to the legality of the original search, an indifference that is not in keeping with established traditions in this country. Other aspects of the German system -such as the ex- 
